Metaphysics and Epistemology : A Guided Anthology.

By: Hetherington, StephenSeries: Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies SerPublisher: Somerset : John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2013Copyright date: ©2013Edition: 1st edDescription: 1 online resource (475 pages)Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781118660348Subject(s): Metaphysics -- Miscellanea.;Knowledge, Theory of -- MiscellaneaGenre/Form: Electronic books. Additional physical formats: Print version:: Metaphysics and Epistemology : A Guided AnthologyDDC classification: 110 LOC classification: BD95.M47 2013ebOnline resources: Click to View
Contents:
Intro -- Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Guided Anthology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Source Acknowledgments -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I The Philosophical Image -- 1 Life and the Search for Philosophical Knowledge -- Book V -- Book VII -- 2 Philosophical Questioning -- The Value of Philosophy -- 3 Philosophy and Fundamental Images -- I. The Philosophical Quest -- II. The Manifest Image -- III. Classical Philosophy and the Manifest Image -- IV. The Scientific Image -- V. The Clash of the Images -- VII. Putting Man into the Scientific Image -- 4 Philosophy as the Analyzing of Key Concepts -- Analytical Philosophy -- Note -- 5 Philosophy as Explaining Underlying Possibilities -- Coercive Philosophy -- Philosophical Explanations -- Explanation versus Proof -- Philosophical Pluralism -- Part II Metaphysics Philosophical Images of Being -- How Is the World at all Physical? -- 6 How Real Are Physical Objects? -- Appearance and Reality -- 7 Are Physical Objects Never Quite as They Appear To Be? -- 8 Are Physical Objects Really Only Objects of Thought? -- Note -- 9 Is Even the Mind Physical? -- The Concept of a Mental State -- The Problem of the Secondary Qualities -- Note -- 10 Is the Physical World All There Is? -- I. The Knowledge Argument for Qualia -- II. The Modal Argument -- III. The "What is it like to be" Argument -- IV. The Bogey of Epiphenomenalism -- Notes -- How Does the World Function? -- 11 Is Causation Only a Kind of Regularity? -- Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion -- Note -- 12 Is Causation Something Singular and Unanalyzable? -- Notes -- How Do Things Ever HaveQualities? -- 13 How Can Individual Things Have Repeatable Qualities? -- 14 How Can Individual Things Not Have Repeatable Qualities? -- I. Nominalism versus Realism -- II. Varieties of Nominalism -- III. Can Predicates Determine Properties?.
IV. Predicate Nominalism and Two Infinite Regresses -- V. Predicates and Possible Predicates -- VI. Predicate Nominalism and Causality -- Note -- References -- How Are There Any Truths? -- 15 Do Facts Make True Whatever Is True? -- 16 Are There Social Facts? -- Social and Institutional Reality -- Observer-Dependency and the Building Blocks of Social Reality -- A Simple Model of the Construction of Institutional Reality -- The Example of Money -- How Institutional Reality Can Be So Powerful -- 17 Is There Only Personally Decided Truth? -- How Is There a World At All? -- 18 Has the World Been Designed by God? -- 19 Is God's Existence Knowable Purely Conceptually? -- Chapter II -- Chapter III -- Chapter IV -- Chapter V -- Chapter XV -- Chapter XX -- Chapter XXII -- A Reply to the Foregoing by a Certain Writer On Behalf of the Fool -- A Reply to the Foregoing by the Authorof the Book in Question -- 20 Has This World Been Actualized by God from Among All Possible Worlds? -- 21 Does This World Exist Because It Has Value Independently of God? -- The Riddle of Existence -- Optimalism and Evaluative Metaphysics -- Axiological Explanation: How Optimalism Works -- The Problem of How Value can have Explanatory Efficacy: Overcoming Some Objections -- The Value Efficacy Objection and the Theological Aspect -- Value Naturalism -- Sidestepping Theology -- Notes -- 22 Can Something Have Value in Itself? -- How Are Persons Persons? -- 23 Is Each Person a Union of Mind and Body? -- Of the Existence of Material Things, and of the Real Distinction between the Soul and Body of Man -- 24 Is Self-Consciousness what Constitutes a Person? -- Of Identity and Diversity -- 25 How Strictly Does Self-Consciousness Constitutea Person? -- Notes -- 26 Are Persons Constituted with Strict Identity At All? -- Simple Teletransportation and the Branch-Line Case.
Why Our Identity Is Not What Matters -- Divided Minds -- What Happens When I Divide? -- What Matters When I Divide? -- Notes -- 27 Are We Animals? -- What Animalism Says -- Why Animalism is Unpopular -- The Thinking-Animal Argument -- Alternative One: There Are No Human Animals -- Alternative Two: Human Animals Can't Think -- Alternative Three: You Are Not Alone -- Hard Choices -- What it would Mean if we were Animals -- How Do People Ever Have Free Will and Moral Responsibility? -- 28 Is There No Possibility of Acting Differently To How One Will in Fact Act? -- 29 Could Our Being Entirely Caused Coexist with Our Acting Freely? -- Of Liberty and Necessity -- 30 Would Being Entirely Caused Undermine Our Personally Constitutive Emotions? -- Note -- 31 Is a Person Morally Responsible Only for Actions Performed Freely? -- Note -- 32 Is Moral Responsibility for a Good Action Different to Moral Responsibility for a Bad Action? -- How Could a Person Be Harmed by Being Dead? -- 33 Is It Impossible To Be Harmedby Being Dead? -- 34 Is It Impossible To Be Harmed by Being Dead at a Particular Time? -- Note -- 35 Would Immortality Be Humanly Possible and Desirable? -- Notes -- 36 Can a Person be Deprived of Benefits by Being Dead? -- Epicurus's Argument Against the Evil of Death -- The Fallacy in the New Version -- How Death Can Be Bad for the One Who Dies -- Further Readings for Part II -- How Is the World at all Physical? -- How Does the World Function? -- How Do Things Ever Have Qualities? -- How Are There Any Truths? -- How Is There a World At All? -- How Are Persons Persons? -- How Do People Ever Have Free Will and Moral Responsibility? -- How Could a Person Be Harmed by Being Dead? -- More Generally … -- Part III Epistemology Philosophical Images of Knowing -- Can We Understand WhatIt Is to Know? -- 37 Is Knowledge a Supported True Belief?.
38 When Should a Belief be Supported by Evidence? -- I. The Duty of Inquiry -- 39 Is Knowledge a Kind of Objective Certainty? -- Knowing as Having the Right to be Sure -- 40 Are All Fallibly Supported True Beliefs Instances of Knowledge? -- Notes -- 41 Must a True Belief Arise Aptly, if it is to be Knowledge? -- Notes -- 42 Must a True Belief Arise Reliably, if it is to be Knowledge? -- I -- Notes -- 43 Where is the Value in Knowing? -- Knowledge from Outside -- Knowledge from Inside -- Notes -- 44 Is Knowledge Always a Virtuously Derived True Belief? -- High-grade and low-grade knowledge -- Notes -- Can We Ever Know Justthrough Observation? -- 45 Is All Knowledge Ultimately Observational? -- Of The Origin of Ideas -- 46 Is There a Problem of Not Knowing that One Is Not Dreaming? -- 47 What Is It Really to be Seeing Something? -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- VI -- VII -- X -- Notes -- 48 Is There a Possibility of Being a Mere and Unknowing Brain in a Vat? -- Brains in a Vat -- Magical Theories of Reference -- The Case of the Brains in a Vat -- Brains in a Vat (Again) -- The Premisses of the Argument -- Note -- 49 Is It Possible to Observe Directly the Objective World? -- Notes -- References -- Can We Ever Know Innately? -- 50 Is It Possible to Know Innately Some Geometrical or Mathematical Truths? -- 51 Is There No Innate Knowledge At All? -- No Innate Principles in the Mind -- No Innate Practical Principles -- Other Considerations Concerning Innate Principles, Both Speculative and Practical -- Of Ideas in General, and their Original -- Can We Ever Know Just through Reflection? -- 52 Is All Knowledge Ultimately Reflective? -- 53 Can Reflective Knowledge Be Substantive and Informative? -- I. The Distinction between Pure and Empirical Knowledge.
II. We are in Possession of Certain Modes of a priori Knowledge, and even the Common Understanding is never without them -- III. Philosophy Stands in Need of a Science which shall Determine the Possibility, the Principles, and the Extent of all a priori Knowledge -- IV. The Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments -- V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason Synthetic a priori Judgments are contained as Principles -- VI. The General Problem of Pure Reason -- VII. The Idea and Division of a Special Science, under the Title "Critique of Pure Reason" -- Note -- 54 Is All Apparently Reflective Knowledge Ultimately Observational? -- Of Demonstration, and Necessary Truths -- The Same Subject Continued -- 55 Is Scientific Reflection Our Best Model for Understanding Reflection? -- Some Consequences of Four Incapacities -- How to Make Our Ideas Clear -- I -- II -- IV -- Note -- 56 Are Some Necessities Known through Observation, Not Reflection? -- Notes -- Can We Know in OtherFundamental Ways? -- 57 Is Knowing-How a Distinct Way of Knowing? -- 58 Is Knowing One's Intention-in-Action a Distinct Way of Knowing? -- Notes -- 59 Is Knowing via What Others Say or Write a Distinct Way of Knowing? -- 1. Testimony and Testimony-Based Belief -- 2. Transmission of Epistemic Properties -- 3. Non-Reductionism and Reductionism -- 60 Is Knowing through Memory a Distinct Way of Knowing? -- Memory -- Can We Fundamentally Fail Ever To Know? -- 61 Are None of our Beliefs More Justifiable than Others? -- What Scepticism Is -- Of the Sceptic -- Of the Principles of Scepticism -- Does the Sceptic dogmatize? -- Do the Sceptics abolish Appearances? -- Of the Criterion of Scepticism -- What is the End of Scepticism? -- Of the general Modes leading to Suspension of Judgement -- Concerning the Ten Modes -- 62 Are None of Our Beliefs Immune from Doubt?.
63 Are We Unable Ever To Extrapolate Justifiedly Beyond Our Observations?.
Summary: "This is an excellent anthology. It combines a wide range of readings on the central and lasting questions of metaphysics and epistemology. The selections are imaginative and in many cases unusual, and Stephen Hetherington introduces each reading with a lucid and lively introduction. Highly recommended!" -Tim Crane, University of Cambridge "This comprehensive and creatively chosen anthology provides an excellent coverage of epistemological and metaphysical topics, from both historical and contemporary perspectives. It is highly recommended." -Duncan Pritchard, University of Edinburgh.
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Intro -- Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Guided Anthology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Source Acknowledgments -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I The Philosophical Image -- 1 Life and the Search for Philosophical Knowledge -- Book V -- Book VII -- 2 Philosophical Questioning -- The Value of Philosophy -- 3 Philosophy and Fundamental Images -- I. The Philosophical Quest -- II. The Manifest Image -- III. Classical Philosophy and the Manifest Image -- IV. The Scientific Image -- V. The Clash of the Images -- VII. Putting Man into the Scientific Image -- 4 Philosophy as the Analyzing of Key Concepts -- Analytical Philosophy -- Note -- 5 Philosophy as Explaining Underlying Possibilities -- Coercive Philosophy -- Philosophical Explanations -- Explanation versus Proof -- Philosophical Pluralism -- Part II Metaphysics Philosophical Images of Being -- How Is the World at all Physical? -- 6 How Real Are Physical Objects? -- Appearance and Reality -- 7 Are Physical Objects Never Quite as They Appear To Be? -- 8 Are Physical Objects Really Only Objects of Thought? -- Note -- 9 Is Even the Mind Physical? -- The Concept of a Mental State -- The Problem of the Secondary Qualities -- Note -- 10 Is the Physical World All There Is? -- I. The Knowledge Argument for Qualia -- II. The Modal Argument -- III. The "What is it like to be" Argument -- IV. The Bogey of Epiphenomenalism -- Notes -- How Does the World Function? -- 11 Is Causation Only a Kind of Regularity? -- Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion -- Note -- 12 Is Causation Something Singular and Unanalyzable? -- Notes -- How Do Things Ever HaveQualities? -- 13 How Can Individual Things Have Repeatable Qualities? -- 14 How Can Individual Things Not Have Repeatable Qualities? -- I. Nominalism versus Realism -- II. Varieties of Nominalism -- III. Can Predicates Determine Properties?.

IV. Predicate Nominalism and Two Infinite Regresses -- V. Predicates and Possible Predicates -- VI. Predicate Nominalism and Causality -- Note -- References -- How Are There Any Truths? -- 15 Do Facts Make True Whatever Is True? -- 16 Are There Social Facts? -- Social and Institutional Reality -- Observer-Dependency and the Building Blocks of Social Reality -- A Simple Model of the Construction of Institutional Reality -- The Example of Money -- How Institutional Reality Can Be So Powerful -- 17 Is There Only Personally Decided Truth? -- How Is There a World At All? -- 18 Has the World Been Designed by God? -- 19 Is God's Existence Knowable Purely Conceptually? -- Chapter II -- Chapter III -- Chapter IV -- Chapter V -- Chapter XV -- Chapter XX -- Chapter XXII -- A Reply to the Foregoing by a Certain Writer On Behalf of the Fool -- A Reply to the Foregoing by the Authorof the Book in Question -- 20 Has This World Been Actualized by God from Among All Possible Worlds? -- 21 Does This World Exist Because It Has Value Independently of God? -- The Riddle of Existence -- Optimalism and Evaluative Metaphysics -- Axiological Explanation: How Optimalism Works -- The Problem of How Value can have Explanatory Efficacy: Overcoming Some Objections -- The Value Efficacy Objection and the Theological Aspect -- Value Naturalism -- Sidestepping Theology -- Notes -- 22 Can Something Have Value in Itself? -- How Are Persons Persons? -- 23 Is Each Person a Union of Mind and Body? -- Of the Existence of Material Things, and of the Real Distinction between the Soul and Body of Man -- 24 Is Self-Consciousness what Constitutes a Person? -- Of Identity and Diversity -- 25 How Strictly Does Self-Consciousness Constitutea Person? -- Notes -- 26 Are Persons Constituted with Strict Identity At All? -- Simple Teletransportation and the Branch-Line Case.

Why Our Identity Is Not What Matters -- Divided Minds -- What Happens When I Divide? -- What Matters When I Divide? -- Notes -- 27 Are We Animals? -- What Animalism Says -- Why Animalism is Unpopular -- The Thinking-Animal Argument -- Alternative One: There Are No Human Animals -- Alternative Two: Human Animals Can't Think -- Alternative Three: You Are Not Alone -- Hard Choices -- What it would Mean if we were Animals -- How Do People Ever Have Free Will and Moral Responsibility? -- 28 Is There No Possibility of Acting Differently To How One Will in Fact Act? -- 29 Could Our Being Entirely Caused Coexist with Our Acting Freely? -- Of Liberty and Necessity -- 30 Would Being Entirely Caused Undermine Our Personally Constitutive Emotions? -- Note -- 31 Is a Person Morally Responsible Only for Actions Performed Freely? -- Note -- 32 Is Moral Responsibility for a Good Action Different to Moral Responsibility for a Bad Action? -- How Could a Person Be Harmed by Being Dead? -- 33 Is It Impossible To Be Harmedby Being Dead? -- 34 Is It Impossible To Be Harmed by Being Dead at a Particular Time? -- Note -- 35 Would Immortality Be Humanly Possible and Desirable? -- Notes -- 36 Can a Person be Deprived of Benefits by Being Dead? -- Epicurus's Argument Against the Evil of Death -- The Fallacy in the New Version -- How Death Can Be Bad for the One Who Dies -- Further Readings for Part II -- How Is the World at all Physical? -- How Does the World Function? -- How Do Things Ever Have Qualities? -- How Are There Any Truths? -- How Is There a World At All? -- How Are Persons Persons? -- How Do People Ever Have Free Will and Moral Responsibility? -- How Could a Person Be Harmed by Being Dead? -- More Generally … -- Part III Epistemology Philosophical Images of Knowing -- Can We Understand WhatIt Is to Know? -- 37 Is Knowledge a Supported True Belief?.

38 When Should a Belief be Supported by Evidence? -- I. The Duty of Inquiry -- 39 Is Knowledge a Kind of Objective Certainty? -- Knowing as Having the Right to be Sure -- 40 Are All Fallibly Supported True Beliefs Instances of Knowledge? -- Notes -- 41 Must a True Belief Arise Aptly, if it is to be Knowledge? -- Notes -- 42 Must a True Belief Arise Reliably, if it is to be Knowledge? -- I -- Notes -- 43 Where is the Value in Knowing? -- Knowledge from Outside -- Knowledge from Inside -- Notes -- 44 Is Knowledge Always a Virtuously Derived True Belief? -- High-grade and low-grade knowledge -- Notes -- Can We Ever Know Justthrough Observation? -- 45 Is All Knowledge Ultimately Observational? -- Of The Origin of Ideas -- 46 Is There a Problem of Not Knowing that One Is Not Dreaming? -- 47 What Is It Really to be Seeing Something? -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- VI -- VII -- X -- Notes -- 48 Is There a Possibility of Being a Mere and Unknowing Brain in a Vat? -- Brains in a Vat -- Magical Theories of Reference -- The Case of the Brains in a Vat -- Brains in a Vat (Again) -- The Premisses of the Argument -- Note -- 49 Is It Possible to Observe Directly the Objective World? -- Notes -- References -- Can We Ever Know Innately? -- 50 Is It Possible to Know Innately Some Geometrical or Mathematical Truths? -- 51 Is There No Innate Knowledge At All? -- No Innate Principles in the Mind -- No Innate Practical Principles -- Other Considerations Concerning Innate Principles, Both Speculative and Practical -- Of Ideas in General, and their Original -- Can We Ever Know Just through Reflection? -- 52 Is All Knowledge Ultimately Reflective? -- 53 Can Reflective Knowledge Be Substantive and Informative? -- I. The Distinction between Pure and Empirical Knowledge.

II. We are in Possession of Certain Modes of a priori Knowledge, and even the Common Understanding is never without them -- III. Philosophy Stands in Need of a Science which shall Determine the Possibility, the Principles, and the Extent of all a priori Knowledge -- IV. The Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments -- V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason Synthetic a priori Judgments are contained as Principles -- VI. The General Problem of Pure Reason -- VII. The Idea and Division of a Special Science, under the Title "Critique of Pure Reason" -- Note -- 54 Is All Apparently Reflective Knowledge Ultimately Observational? -- Of Demonstration, and Necessary Truths -- The Same Subject Continued -- 55 Is Scientific Reflection Our Best Model for Understanding Reflection? -- Some Consequences of Four Incapacities -- How to Make Our Ideas Clear -- I -- II -- IV -- Note -- 56 Are Some Necessities Known through Observation, Not Reflection? -- Notes -- Can We Know in OtherFundamental Ways? -- 57 Is Knowing-How a Distinct Way of Knowing? -- 58 Is Knowing One's Intention-in-Action a Distinct Way of Knowing? -- Notes -- 59 Is Knowing via What Others Say or Write a Distinct Way of Knowing? -- 1. Testimony and Testimony-Based Belief -- 2. Transmission of Epistemic Properties -- 3. Non-Reductionism and Reductionism -- 60 Is Knowing through Memory a Distinct Way of Knowing? -- Memory -- Can We Fundamentally Fail Ever To Know? -- 61 Are None of our Beliefs More Justifiable than Others? -- What Scepticism Is -- Of the Sceptic -- Of the Principles of Scepticism -- Does the Sceptic dogmatize? -- Do the Sceptics abolish Appearances? -- Of the Criterion of Scepticism -- What is the End of Scepticism? -- Of the general Modes leading to Suspension of Judgement -- Concerning the Ten Modes -- 62 Are None of Our Beliefs Immune from Doubt?.

63 Are We Unable Ever To Extrapolate Justifiedly Beyond Our Observations?.

"This is an excellent anthology. It combines a wide range of readings on the central and lasting questions of metaphysics and epistemology. The selections are imaginative and in many cases unusual, and Stephen Hetherington introduces each reading with a lucid and lively introduction. Highly recommended!" -Tim Crane, University of Cambridge "This comprehensive and creatively chosen anthology provides an excellent coverage of epistemological and metaphysical topics, from both historical and contemporary perspectives. It is highly recommended." -Duncan Pritchard, University of Edinburgh.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2019. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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