Saving Truth from Paradox.

By: Field, Hartry HPublisher: Oxford : Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2008Copyright date: ©2008Description: 1 online resource (423 pages)Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780191528163Subject(s): Paradox.;TruthGenre/Form: Electronic books. Additional physical formats: Print version:: Saving Truth from ParadoxDDC classification: 165 LOC classification: BC199.P2F537 2008Online resources: Click to View
Contents:
Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1 Grelling's paradox -- 2 Russell's paradox for properties -- 3 … v. Russell's paradox for sets -- 4 Solution routes to Russell's paradox for properties -- 5 Grelling again -- 6 Change of logic and change of meaning -- 7 Some connections to other issues -- PART I. A SELECTIVE BACKGROUND -- 1 Self-Reference and Tarski's Theorem -- 1.1 Self-reference and Gödel-Tarski diagonalization -- 1.2 Tarski's ''Undefinability Theorem'' -- 1.3 Tarski's ''Undefinability Theorem'' states more than undefinability -- 1.4 Another form of Tarski's theorem -- 1.5 Can set-theoretic truth be defined? -- 1.6 Inductive characterizations and restricted truth definitions -- 1.7 Further remarks on explicit definition -- 2 Validity and the Unprovability of Soundness -- 2.1 Validity and the necessary preservation of truth -- 2.2 Truth in a model -- 2.3 The Kreisel squeezing argument -- 2.4 The unprovability of soundness -- 3 Kripke's Theory of Truth (Strong Kleene Version) -- 3.1 The Kripke construction for restricted languages -- 3.2 The Kripke construction for unrestricted languages -- 3.3 Conservativeness -- 3.4 Does truth coincide with semantic value 1 even for restricted languages? (KFS v. FM) -- 3.5 Gaps and gluts -- 3.6 The weaknesses of Kripke's construction -- 3.7 Acceptance and rejection in KFS -- 3.8 Defectiveness again -- Appendix: Kleene logic and other deMorgan logics -- 4 Adding a Conditional? Curry and Lukasiewicz -- 4.1 The Curry paradox -- 4.2 Continuum-valued semantics -- 4.3 What do the semantic values mean? -- 4.4 Determinate truth in continuum-valued semantics -- 4.5 Ultimate failure: quantifiers -- 4.6 Indeterminacy and rejection -- Appendix: The Conservativeness Theorem -- 5 Interlude on Vagueness, and the Paradoxes of König and Berry -- 5.1 Must vague predicates have sharp boundaries?.
5.2 Penumbral connections and higher order vagueness -- 5.3 Must higher order vagueness collapse? -- 5.4 Linear order? -- 5.5 The König and Berry paradoxes -- 5.6 The role of a classical meta-theory for a non-classical language -- PART II. BROADLY CLASSICAL APPROACHES -- 6 Introduction to the Broadly Classical Options -- 7 Truth-Value Gaps in Classical Theories -- 7.1 Gaps and (T-OUT) -- 7.2 Kleene-style gaps versus supervaluation-style gaps -- 7.3 Declaring one's axioms untrue -- 7.4 Propositions to the rescue? -- 7.5 Truth-of, heterologicality, and properties -- 7.6 Restricted (T-OUT) -- 7.7 Does declaring one's axioms untrue destroy the purpose of truth? -- 8 Truth-Value Gluts in Classical Theories -- 8.1 Gluts and (T-IN) -- 8.2 (T-IN) theories -- 8.3 What do glut theories say about themselves? -- 8.4 Evaluation of gluts v. gaps -- 9 A Second Interlude on Vagueness -- 9.1 Indeterminacy in classical theories -- 9.2 Supervaluationism -- 10 Introduction to Supervaluational Approaches to Paradox -- 10.1 The simplest supervaluational fixed points -- 10.2 Indeterminacy, weak validity, and reasoning by cases -- 10.3 The status of the truth rules -- 10.4 Indeterminacy again -- 10.5 Boolean-valued semantics -- 10.6 Strong validity, and weak validity revisited -- 10.7 Yogi Berra's advice and ignorance interpretations -- 11 A Survey of Supervaluational and Revision-Rule Theories -- 11.1 Simple supervaluationism is very weak -- 11.2 General supervaluational fixed point theories -- 11.3 Avoiding the problems of simple supervaluationism -- 11.4 Rule-of-revision theories -- 11.5 Soundness proofs revisited -- 12 Are Supervaluational and Revision Theories Self-Undermining? -- 12.1 What do strong supervaluational and strong revision theories say about themselves? -- 12.2 What do medium supervaluational and medium revision theories say about themselves?.
12.3 Are even the strong theories really ''self-undermining''? -- 12.4 Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem -- 12.5 Conclusion -- 13 Intersubstitutivity and the Purpose of Truth -- 13.1 Harmless gaps -- 13.2 Acceptance and rejection in weakly classical theories -- 13.3 The rest of the iceberg -- 14 Stratified and Contextual Theories -- 14.1 Contextual theories and ''Strengthened Liar reasoning'' -- 14.2 Stratified gap and glut theories -- 14.3 ''The ghost of the Tarski hierarchy'': stratified internal fixed point theories -- 14.4 Stratified determinacy predicates for weakly classical theories -- PART III. PARACOMPLETENESS -- 15 What Is To Be Done? -- 15.1 A framework for generalizing continuum-valued semantics -- 15.2 Determinateness and the Liar hierarchy -- 15.3 More on the never-collapsing hierarchy of determinately operators -- 16 Fixed Points and Revision Rules for Conditionals -- 16.1 Yablo fixed points -- 16.2 Revisionism -- 16.3 The transfinite Liar hierarchy and other examples -- Appendix: The Fundamental Theorem -- 17 More on Revision-Theoretic Conditionals -- 17.1 Algebraic semantics -- 17.2 Conservativeness and schemas -- 17.3 Modal semantics -- 17.4 Laws and non-laws -- 17.5 Variations -- 18 What Has Been Done -- PART IV. MORE ON PARACOMPLETE SOLUTIONS -- 19 Validity, Truth-Preservation, and the Second Incompleteness Theorem -- 19.1 Another form of Curry's paradox -- 19.2 The validity argument -- 19.3 The Second Incompleteness Theorem -- 20 Other Paradoxes -- 20.1 Paradoxes of denotation -- 20.2 The naive theory of properties, relations, and propositions -- 20.3 Set theory -- 20.4 Paradoxes of truth and validity -- 20.5 ''Non-bivalent'' validity? -- 21 Do Paracomplete Solutions Depend on Expressive Limitations? -- 21.1 Boolean negation and ''exclusion negation'' -- 21.2 Intuitionist negation and the intuitionist conditional.
21.3 Wright's argument -- 21.4 Restall's argument -- 22 Determinateness, Hyper-Determinateness, and Super-Determinateness -- 22.1 Transfinite iteration made rigorous -- 22.2 Hyper-determinateness: the problem -- 22.3 Hyper-determinateness: the solution -- 22.4 Expanding the language? -- 22.5 Higher-order resources -- 22.6 Super-determinateness -- 23 Determinateness, Stratification, and Revenge -- 23.1 Stratified truth v. iterated determinacy -- 23.2 Genuine costs -- 23.3 Trying to get revenge -- PART V. PARACONSISTENT DIALETHEISM -- 24 An Introduction to Paraconsistent Dialetheism -- 24.1 Dialetheism, the truth schema, and intersubstitutivity -- 24.2 Acceptance, rejection, and degree of belief -- 24.3 Gluts, gaps, and intersubstitutivity again -- 25 Some Dialetheic Theories -- 25.1 Priest's LP -- 25.2 Dualizing paracomplete theories -- 25.3 Priest's conditionals -- 26 Paraconsistent Dialetheism and Soundness -- 26.1 The first incompleteness theorem, Curry's paradox, and truth-preservation -- 26.2 Can we get even restricted truth-preservation? -- 27 Hyper-Determinacy and Revenge -- 27.1 Model theory, designated values and truth -- 27.2 Sole truth and sole falsehood -- 27.3 Extended paradox? -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.
Summary: This is an ambitious investigation into paradoxes of truth and related issues, with occasional forays into notions such as vagueness, the nature of validity, and the Gödel incompleteness theorems. Hartry Field presents a new approach to the paradoxes and provides a systematic and detailed account of the main competing approaches.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Ebrary Ebrary Afghanistan
Available EBKAF00052907
Ebrary Ebrary Algeria
Available
Ebrary Ebrary Cyprus
Available
Ebrary Ebrary Egypt
Available
Ebrary Ebrary Libya
Available
Ebrary Ebrary Morocco
Available
Ebrary Ebrary Nepal
Available EBKNP00052907
Ebrary Ebrary Sudan

Access a wide range of magazines and books using Pressreader and Ebook central.

Enjoy your reading, British Council Sudan.

Available
Ebrary Ebrary Tunisia
Available
Total holds: 0

Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1 Grelling's paradox -- 2 Russell's paradox for properties -- 3 … v. Russell's paradox for sets -- 4 Solution routes to Russell's paradox for properties -- 5 Grelling again -- 6 Change of logic and change of meaning -- 7 Some connections to other issues -- PART I. A SELECTIVE BACKGROUND -- 1 Self-Reference and Tarski's Theorem -- 1.1 Self-reference and Gödel-Tarski diagonalization -- 1.2 Tarski's ''Undefinability Theorem'' -- 1.3 Tarski's ''Undefinability Theorem'' states more than undefinability -- 1.4 Another form of Tarski's theorem -- 1.5 Can set-theoretic truth be defined? -- 1.6 Inductive characterizations and restricted truth definitions -- 1.7 Further remarks on explicit definition -- 2 Validity and the Unprovability of Soundness -- 2.1 Validity and the necessary preservation of truth -- 2.2 Truth in a model -- 2.3 The Kreisel squeezing argument -- 2.4 The unprovability of soundness -- 3 Kripke's Theory of Truth (Strong Kleene Version) -- 3.1 The Kripke construction for restricted languages -- 3.2 The Kripke construction for unrestricted languages -- 3.3 Conservativeness -- 3.4 Does truth coincide with semantic value 1 even for restricted languages? (KFS v. FM) -- 3.5 Gaps and gluts -- 3.6 The weaknesses of Kripke's construction -- 3.7 Acceptance and rejection in KFS -- 3.8 Defectiveness again -- Appendix: Kleene logic and other deMorgan logics -- 4 Adding a Conditional? Curry and Lukasiewicz -- 4.1 The Curry paradox -- 4.2 Continuum-valued semantics -- 4.3 What do the semantic values mean? -- 4.4 Determinate truth in continuum-valued semantics -- 4.5 Ultimate failure: quantifiers -- 4.6 Indeterminacy and rejection -- Appendix: The Conservativeness Theorem -- 5 Interlude on Vagueness, and the Paradoxes of König and Berry -- 5.1 Must vague predicates have sharp boundaries?.

5.2 Penumbral connections and higher order vagueness -- 5.3 Must higher order vagueness collapse? -- 5.4 Linear order? -- 5.5 The König and Berry paradoxes -- 5.6 The role of a classical meta-theory for a non-classical language -- PART II. BROADLY CLASSICAL APPROACHES -- 6 Introduction to the Broadly Classical Options -- 7 Truth-Value Gaps in Classical Theories -- 7.1 Gaps and (T-OUT) -- 7.2 Kleene-style gaps versus supervaluation-style gaps -- 7.3 Declaring one's axioms untrue -- 7.4 Propositions to the rescue? -- 7.5 Truth-of, heterologicality, and properties -- 7.6 Restricted (T-OUT) -- 7.7 Does declaring one's axioms untrue destroy the purpose of truth? -- 8 Truth-Value Gluts in Classical Theories -- 8.1 Gluts and (T-IN) -- 8.2 (T-IN) theories -- 8.3 What do glut theories say about themselves? -- 8.4 Evaluation of gluts v. gaps -- 9 A Second Interlude on Vagueness -- 9.1 Indeterminacy in classical theories -- 9.2 Supervaluationism -- 10 Introduction to Supervaluational Approaches to Paradox -- 10.1 The simplest supervaluational fixed points -- 10.2 Indeterminacy, weak validity, and reasoning by cases -- 10.3 The status of the truth rules -- 10.4 Indeterminacy again -- 10.5 Boolean-valued semantics -- 10.6 Strong validity, and weak validity revisited -- 10.7 Yogi Berra's advice and ignorance interpretations -- 11 A Survey of Supervaluational and Revision-Rule Theories -- 11.1 Simple supervaluationism is very weak -- 11.2 General supervaluational fixed point theories -- 11.3 Avoiding the problems of simple supervaluationism -- 11.4 Rule-of-revision theories -- 11.5 Soundness proofs revisited -- 12 Are Supervaluational and Revision Theories Self-Undermining? -- 12.1 What do strong supervaluational and strong revision theories say about themselves? -- 12.2 What do medium supervaluational and medium revision theories say about themselves?.

12.3 Are even the strong theories really ''self-undermining''? -- 12.4 Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem -- 12.5 Conclusion -- 13 Intersubstitutivity and the Purpose of Truth -- 13.1 Harmless gaps -- 13.2 Acceptance and rejection in weakly classical theories -- 13.3 The rest of the iceberg -- 14 Stratified and Contextual Theories -- 14.1 Contextual theories and ''Strengthened Liar reasoning'' -- 14.2 Stratified gap and glut theories -- 14.3 ''The ghost of the Tarski hierarchy'': stratified internal fixed point theories -- 14.4 Stratified determinacy predicates for weakly classical theories -- PART III. PARACOMPLETENESS -- 15 What Is To Be Done? -- 15.1 A framework for generalizing continuum-valued semantics -- 15.2 Determinateness and the Liar hierarchy -- 15.3 More on the never-collapsing hierarchy of determinately operators -- 16 Fixed Points and Revision Rules for Conditionals -- 16.1 Yablo fixed points -- 16.2 Revisionism -- 16.3 The transfinite Liar hierarchy and other examples -- Appendix: The Fundamental Theorem -- 17 More on Revision-Theoretic Conditionals -- 17.1 Algebraic semantics -- 17.2 Conservativeness and schemas -- 17.3 Modal semantics -- 17.4 Laws and non-laws -- 17.5 Variations -- 18 What Has Been Done -- PART IV. MORE ON PARACOMPLETE SOLUTIONS -- 19 Validity, Truth-Preservation, and the Second Incompleteness Theorem -- 19.1 Another form of Curry's paradox -- 19.2 The validity argument -- 19.3 The Second Incompleteness Theorem -- 20 Other Paradoxes -- 20.1 Paradoxes of denotation -- 20.2 The naive theory of properties, relations, and propositions -- 20.3 Set theory -- 20.4 Paradoxes of truth and validity -- 20.5 ''Non-bivalent'' validity? -- 21 Do Paracomplete Solutions Depend on Expressive Limitations? -- 21.1 Boolean negation and ''exclusion negation'' -- 21.2 Intuitionist negation and the intuitionist conditional.

21.3 Wright's argument -- 21.4 Restall's argument -- 22 Determinateness, Hyper-Determinateness, and Super-Determinateness -- 22.1 Transfinite iteration made rigorous -- 22.2 Hyper-determinateness: the problem -- 22.3 Hyper-determinateness: the solution -- 22.4 Expanding the language? -- 22.5 Higher-order resources -- 22.6 Super-determinateness -- 23 Determinateness, Stratification, and Revenge -- 23.1 Stratified truth v. iterated determinacy -- 23.2 Genuine costs -- 23.3 Trying to get revenge -- PART V. PARACONSISTENT DIALETHEISM -- 24 An Introduction to Paraconsistent Dialetheism -- 24.1 Dialetheism, the truth schema, and intersubstitutivity -- 24.2 Acceptance, rejection, and degree of belief -- 24.3 Gluts, gaps, and intersubstitutivity again -- 25 Some Dialetheic Theories -- 25.1 Priest's LP -- 25.2 Dualizing paracomplete theories -- 25.3 Priest's conditionals -- 26 Paraconsistent Dialetheism and Soundness -- 26.1 The first incompleteness theorem, Curry's paradox, and truth-preservation -- 26.2 Can we get even restricted truth-preservation? -- 27 Hyper-Determinacy and Revenge -- 27.1 Model theory, designated values and truth -- 27.2 Sole truth and sole falsehood -- 27.3 Extended paradox? -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

This is an ambitious investigation into paradoxes of truth and related issues, with occasional forays into notions such as vagueness, the nature of validity, and the Gödel incompleteness theorems. Hartry Field presents a new approach to the paradoxes and provides a systematic and detailed account of the main competing approaches.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2019. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.