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When Majorities Fail : The Russian Parliament, 1990-1993.

By: Contributor(s): Series: Political Economy of Institutions and DecisionsPublisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2002Copyright date: ©2002Description: 1 online resource (297 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780511148736
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: When Majorities Fail : The Russian Parliament, 1990–1993DDC classification:
  • 320.94709049
LOC classification:
  • JN6697 .A53 2002
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover -- Half-title -- Series-title -- Dedication -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- THE CASE OF RUSSIA: A REALITY CHECK FOR THEORIES OF MAJORITY RULE -- Particulars of Russia's Early Legislative Experience -- The Nonobvious Implications of an Underinstitutionalized Legislature -- OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CAUSES OF RUSSIA'S LEGISLATIVE FAILTURE -- CONCLUSIONS -- PLAN OF THE BOOK -- 2 Cycling in Action: Russia's Constitutional Crisis -- THE BEGINNINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS -- THE EMERGENCE OF INSTABILITY -- AT THE CRUCIAL MOMENT A BREAKDOWN IN MAJORITY RULE: RUSSIA'S FIRST AND LAST CHANCE FOR PEACEFUL CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM -- Vote to Place the New Constitution onto the Agenda of the Sixth Congress -- Vote to Approve General Draft of the New Constitution -- A Vote Against the Preamble and Chapter 1 -- A Vote for the Preamble and Chapter 1 -- Votes in Favor of Nine Amendments to Chapter 2 and a Final Vote Against the Chapter -- Votes in Favor of Five Amendments to Chapter 3 and a Final Vote Against the Chapter -- FINAL WEEK OF DEBATE ON DRAFT CONSTITUTION -- Vote to Approve Chapter 4 -- Votes in Favor of Six Amendments to Chapter 5 and Final Vote to Approve the Chapter -- Vote to Approve Chapter 6 -- Vote on New Constitution at Sixth Congress -- AGENDA CONTROL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM -- Khasbulatov as Agenda Setter -- Implications of Agenda Setter -- Khasbulatov's Strategic Control of the Legislative Agenda -- CONCLUSIONS -- 3 Cycling and Its Consequences: A Theoretical Framework -- CYCLING: DEFINITION AND DISCUSSION -- THE ROLE OF INSTITUATIONAL DESIGN IN INDUCING EQUILIBRIA -- SINCERE VERSUS SOPHISTICATED VOTING -- CONCLUSIONS -- 4 Institutional Design and Implications for Majority Rule -- COMMITTEES AND PRESIDIUM IN THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT -- THE POWERS OF THE CHAIRMAN AND AGENDA CONTROL.
FROM DOMINANCE OF THE PRESIDIUM TO DOMINANCE OF THE PARLIAMENT -- CONCLUSIONS -- 5 Issue Dimensions and Partisan Alliances -- PARTISAN AEFILIATIONS IN THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT -- Historical Background -- Before the Collapse of the soviet Union - Two Grand Coalitions -- Immediate Aftermath of the Collapse - Parliament Split into Multiple Factions -- Democratic Russia -- Radical Democrats -- Left of Center -- Non-Party Deputies -- Free Russia -- Civic Society -- Sovereignty and Equality -- Change - New Politics -- Industrial Union -- Workers' Union -- Communists of Russia -- Agrarian Union -- Russia -- Fatherland -- Unaffiliated Members -- ISSUE DIMENSIONS IN THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT -- Attempt to Reduce Deputy Groups and stabilize Outcomes: The Formation of Three Blocs of Factions -- CONCLUSIONS -- Appendix 5A -- 6 The Structure of Preferences -- STRUCTURE OF DEPUTY PREFERENCES -- Roll Call Votes of the Russian Deputies -- Homogeous Versus Heterogeneous Preferences -- Mapping Deputy Ideal Points Using Principal Components -- Deputy Ideal Points -- Sessions 2 and 3 (Figures 6.2a and 6.2b) -- Sessions 4 and 5 (Figures 6.2c and 6.2d) -- Ideal Points of Presidium Members -- DIMENSIONALITY OF THE ISSUE SPACE -- Interpretation of Issue Dimensions -- The Sobyanin Index -- Media Faction Ideal Points -- CONCLUSIONS -- Appendix 6A -- THE BASICS OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS -- The Model -- 7 Legislative Instability -- SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF CYCLING IN THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT: ADAPTATION OF SCHOFIELD'S MODEL -- Examples -- Nonempty Core in Sessions 2, 3, and 6 -- Nonempty Cycle Set in Sessions 4 and 5 -- Cycle Sets and Agenda Control -- SYSTEMATIC DETECTION OF CYCLING -- VOTES IN THE CYCLE SET: EVIDENCE BASED ON COALTION SUPPORT -- Cycle Set in Session 4: Tabular Evidence -- Summary of Coalition Support in Session 4 -- Cycle Sets in Session 5: Tabular Evidence.
Summary of Coalition Support in Session 5 -- MAPPING VOTES IN TWO DIMENSIONS -- Votes in Session 4 -- Votes in Session 5 -- Cyclical Outcomes: Session 4 -- Noncyclical Outcomes: Session 4 -- Noncyclical Outcomes: Session 5 -- CONCLUSIONS -- Appendix 7A -- BIPLOTS OF VOTES AND BLOCS -- 8 The Dynamics of Agenda Control in the Russian Parliament -- IMPLICATIONS OF AGENDA CONTROL IN ONE DIMENSION -- Assumptions of the Setter Model -- Institutional Rules of the Game -- Yeltsin's Ideal Point -- Application of the Model -- Predictions of the Romer and Rosenthal Setter Model -- IMPLICATIONS OF AGENDA CONTROL IN TWO OR MORE DIMENSIONS -- Assumptions of the Cycling Model -- Institutional Rules -- Khasbulatov's Ideal Point -- Predictions of Cycling Model -- Reflections on Yeltsin and Khasbulatov -- CONCLUSIONS -- 9 Implications of Disequilibrium in Transitional Legislatures -- References -- Index.
Summary: When Majorities Fail is a study of institutional failure in Russia's first democratic legislature.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Ebrary Ebrary Afghanistan Available EBKAF0005703
Ebrary Ebrary Algeria Available
Ebrary Ebrary Cyprus Available
Ebrary Ebrary Egypt Available
Ebrary Ebrary Libya Available
Ebrary Ebrary Morocco Available
Ebrary Ebrary Nepal Available EBKNP0005703
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Total holds: 0

Cover -- Half-title -- Series-title -- Dedication -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- THE CASE OF RUSSIA: A REALITY CHECK FOR THEORIES OF MAJORITY RULE -- Particulars of Russia's Early Legislative Experience -- The Nonobvious Implications of an Underinstitutionalized Legislature -- OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CAUSES OF RUSSIA'S LEGISLATIVE FAILTURE -- CONCLUSIONS -- PLAN OF THE BOOK -- 2 Cycling in Action: Russia's Constitutional Crisis -- THE BEGINNINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS -- THE EMERGENCE OF INSTABILITY -- AT THE CRUCIAL MOMENT A BREAKDOWN IN MAJORITY RULE: RUSSIA'S FIRST AND LAST CHANCE FOR PEACEFUL CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM -- Vote to Place the New Constitution onto the Agenda of the Sixth Congress -- Vote to Approve General Draft of the New Constitution -- A Vote Against the Preamble and Chapter 1 -- A Vote for the Preamble and Chapter 1 -- Votes in Favor of Nine Amendments to Chapter 2 and a Final Vote Against the Chapter -- Votes in Favor of Five Amendments to Chapter 3 and a Final Vote Against the Chapter -- FINAL WEEK OF DEBATE ON DRAFT CONSTITUTION -- Vote to Approve Chapter 4 -- Votes in Favor of Six Amendments to Chapter 5 and Final Vote to Approve the Chapter -- Vote to Approve Chapter 6 -- Vote on New Constitution at Sixth Congress -- AGENDA CONTROL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM -- Khasbulatov as Agenda Setter -- Implications of Agenda Setter -- Khasbulatov's Strategic Control of the Legislative Agenda -- CONCLUSIONS -- 3 Cycling and Its Consequences: A Theoretical Framework -- CYCLING: DEFINITION AND DISCUSSION -- THE ROLE OF INSTITUATIONAL DESIGN IN INDUCING EQUILIBRIA -- SINCERE VERSUS SOPHISTICATED VOTING -- CONCLUSIONS -- 4 Institutional Design and Implications for Majority Rule -- COMMITTEES AND PRESIDIUM IN THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT -- THE POWERS OF THE CHAIRMAN AND AGENDA CONTROL.

FROM DOMINANCE OF THE PRESIDIUM TO DOMINANCE OF THE PARLIAMENT -- CONCLUSIONS -- 5 Issue Dimensions and Partisan Alliances -- PARTISAN AEFILIATIONS IN THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT -- Historical Background -- Before the Collapse of the soviet Union - Two Grand Coalitions -- Immediate Aftermath of the Collapse - Parliament Split into Multiple Factions -- Democratic Russia -- Radical Democrats -- Left of Center -- Non-Party Deputies -- Free Russia -- Civic Society -- Sovereignty and Equality -- Change - New Politics -- Industrial Union -- Workers' Union -- Communists of Russia -- Agrarian Union -- Russia -- Fatherland -- Unaffiliated Members -- ISSUE DIMENSIONS IN THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT -- Attempt to Reduce Deputy Groups and stabilize Outcomes: The Formation of Three Blocs of Factions -- CONCLUSIONS -- Appendix 5A -- 6 The Structure of Preferences -- STRUCTURE OF DEPUTY PREFERENCES -- Roll Call Votes of the Russian Deputies -- Homogeous Versus Heterogeneous Preferences -- Mapping Deputy Ideal Points Using Principal Components -- Deputy Ideal Points -- Sessions 2 and 3 (Figures 6.2a and 6.2b) -- Sessions 4 and 5 (Figures 6.2c and 6.2d) -- Ideal Points of Presidium Members -- DIMENSIONALITY OF THE ISSUE SPACE -- Interpretation of Issue Dimensions -- The Sobyanin Index -- Media Faction Ideal Points -- CONCLUSIONS -- Appendix 6A -- THE BASICS OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS -- The Model -- 7 Legislative Instability -- SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF CYCLING IN THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT: ADAPTATION OF SCHOFIELD'S MODEL -- Examples -- Nonempty Core in Sessions 2, 3, and 6 -- Nonempty Cycle Set in Sessions 4 and 5 -- Cycle Sets and Agenda Control -- SYSTEMATIC DETECTION OF CYCLING -- VOTES IN THE CYCLE SET: EVIDENCE BASED ON COALTION SUPPORT -- Cycle Set in Session 4: Tabular Evidence -- Summary of Coalition Support in Session 4 -- Cycle Sets in Session 5: Tabular Evidence.

Summary of Coalition Support in Session 5 -- MAPPING VOTES IN TWO DIMENSIONS -- Votes in Session 4 -- Votes in Session 5 -- Cyclical Outcomes: Session 4 -- Noncyclical Outcomes: Session 4 -- Noncyclical Outcomes: Session 5 -- CONCLUSIONS -- Appendix 7A -- BIPLOTS OF VOTES AND BLOCS -- 8 The Dynamics of Agenda Control in the Russian Parliament -- IMPLICATIONS OF AGENDA CONTROL IN ONE DIMENSION -- Assumptions of the Setter Model -- Institutional Rules of the Game -- Yeltsin's Ideal Point -- Application of the Model -- Predictions of the Romer and Rosenthal Setter Model -- IMPLICATIONS OF AGENDA CONTROL IN TWO OR MORE DIMENSIONS -- Assumptions of the Cycling Model -- Institutional Rules -- Khasbulatov's Ideal Point -- Predictions of Cycling Model -- Reflections on Yeltsin and Khasbulatov -- CONCLUSIONS -- 9 Implications of Disequilibrium in Transitional Legislatures -- References -- Index.

When Majorities Fail is a study of institutional failure in Russia's first democratic legislature.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2019. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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