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Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy.

By: Publisher: Oxford : Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2013Copyright date: ©2012Description: 1 online resource (242 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780191632853
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Wittgenstein's MetaphilosophyDDC classification:
  • 192
LOC classification:
  • B3376.W564 -- H67 2012eb
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy -- 1.1 The fundamental idea -- 1.2 Sceptical conundrums -- 1.3 Illustrations from outside philosophy -- 1.4 The role of language -- 1.5 Odd objects: the case of numbers -- 1.6 Questions and objections -- 2 A critique of theoretical philosophy -- 2.1 T-philosophy -- 2.2 Intuition → generalization → paradox -- 2.3 Theoretical reactions -- 2.4 The irrationality of scientism -- 2.5 Kinds of theory and their peculiar discontents -- 2.6 The general form of a philosophical issue -- 2.7 Exceptions -- 2.8 An anti-theoretical theory? -- 2.9 Does Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy rest on his view of meaning? -- 2.10 Two philosophies? -- 3 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus -- 3.1 Outline -- 3.2 Metaphysics -- 3.3 Meaning -- 3.4 The structure and limits of language -- 3.5 Metaphilosophy -- 3.6 Throwing away the ladder -- 3.7 Self-criticism -- 3.8 Conclusion -- 4 Meaning -- 4.1 Wittgenstein's objectives -- 4.2 Wittgenstein's definition of "meaning" as "use" -- 4.3 Paradoxes of meaning and their dissolution -- 5 Kripke's Wittgenstein -- 5.1 A sceptical account of meaning -- 5.2 The rational-guidance argument -- 5.3 The truth argument -- 5.4 Appraisal of Kripke's reasoning -- 5.5 The paradoxical conclusion -- 5.6 Kripke's "sceptical solution" -- 5.7 Individualistic language -- 5.8 The differences between Kripkenstein and Wittgenstein -- 6 The "mystery" of consciousness -- 6.1 Pseudo-problems -- 6.2 The case of consciousness -- 6.3 The "private language argument" -- 6.4 Behaviourism -- 6.5 Inverted spectra -- 6.6 Pseudo-qualia -- 6.7 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.
Summary: Paul Horwich presents a bold new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy - and not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use - that underpins his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion.
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Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy -- 1.1 The fundamental idea -- 1.2 Sceptical conundrums -- 1.3 Illustrations from outside philosophy -- 1.4 The role of language -- 1.5 Odd objects: the case of numbers -- 1.6 Questions and objections -- 2 A critique of theoretical philosophy -- 2.1 T-philosophy -- 2.2 Intuition → generalization → paradox -- 2.3 Theoretical reactions -- 2.4 The irrationality of scientism -- 2.5 Kinds of theory and their peculiar discontents -- 2.6 The general form of a philosophical issue -- 2.7 Exceptions -- 2.8 An anti-theoretical theory? -- 2.9 Does Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy rest on his view of meaning? -- 2.10 Two philosophies? -- 3 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus -- 3.1 Outline -- 3.2 Metaphysics -- 3.3 Meaning -- 3.4 The structure and limits of language -- 3.5 Metaphilosophy -- 3.6 Throwing away the ladder -- 3.7 Self-criticism -- 3.8 Conclusion -- 4 Meaning -- 4.1 Wittgenstein's objectives -- 4.2 Wittgenstein's definition of "meaning" as "use" -- 4.3 Paradoxes of meaning and their dissolution -- 5 Kripke's Wittgenstein -- 5.1 A sceptical account of meaning -- 5.2 The rational-guidance argument -- 5.3 The truth argument -- 5.4 Appraisal of Kripke's reasoning -- 5.5 The paradoxical conclusion -- 5.6 Kripke's "sceptical solution" -- 5.7 Individualistic language -- 5.8 The differences between Kripkenstein and Wittgenstein -- 6 The "mystery" of consciousness -- 6.1 Pseudo-problems -- 6.2 The case of consciousness -- 6.3 The "private language argument" -- 6.4 Behaviourism -- 6.5 Inverted spectra -- 6.6 Pseudo-qualia -- 6.7 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.

Paul Horwich presents a bold new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy - and not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use - that underpins his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2019. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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